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Are Litigating Attorneys Debt Collectors
Under the Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act?
by Tang Thanh Trai Le

Tang Thanh Trai Le is
professor of law at the
Notre Dame Law School,
Notre Dame, IN 46556;
(219) 631-6241.

Congress enacted in 1977 the
Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (the "Debt Collection
Act" or the "Act") to "eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by
debt collectors, to insure that those
debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
state action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses."
15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988).
This case focuses on the scope of
the definition of debt collector in the
Act. The Debt Collection Act defines
debt collector as "any person who
uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts,
or who regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6) (1988). The act prohibits
abusive and deceptive practices
such as late night telephone calls to
consumers, calls to consumers'
employers, frequent calls, disclosure
of debt to third parties, overstated
threats of legal action, harassment,
abuse, and threats of property
seizure.

The Act, however, excludes certain
persons falling under this definition
from the requirements of the law.
Originally, it excluded "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an
attorney on behalf of and in the
name of a client." As a result,
creditors seeking to circumvent the
requirements of the Act turned to
attorneys. Despite the exclusion,
in FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32
(7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit
held that an attorney who devoted
his practice primarily to debt
collection did not qualify for the
exclusion solely because he possessed a license to practice law. The
court ruled that attorneys remained
liable under the Act when they functioned as debt collectors.
Congress amended the Debt
Collection Act in 1986 to eliminate
the exemption for attorneys. The
amendment unquestionably brought
attorneys within the scope of the Act
when they devoted most of their
practice to debt collection - for
instance, when attorneys sent
collection letters to debtors.

Case

atna

Glance
In 1986 Congress
amended the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
to include attorneys
under the definition of
debt collector. Now the
Supreme Court is asked
to determine if the law
applies to attorneys
suing debtors on behalf
of clients, not just
when they conduct
debt-collection
activities.
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Debtors, however, began to bring
suits alleging that attorneys also had
to adhere to the requirements of the
Act when they conducted litigation
activities - for instance, when
attorneys filed lawsuits against
debtors on behalf of a client. In this
case, the Supreme Court will decide
if an attorney whose practice
includes debt collection must adhere
to the requirements of the Act when
the debt collection occurs solely as
part of a lawsuit.

ISSUE
Is an attorney litigating to collect a
debt from a consumer on behalf of a
client a debt collector within the
meaning of the Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act?
FACTS
Darlene Jenkins obtained a loan to
purchase an automobile from Gainer
Bank of Gary, Indiana ("Gainer"),
with the automobile serving as collateral. The loan agreement required
Jenkins to buy insurance to "keep
the collateral fully insured against
loss or damage." If she failed to do
so, Gainer could purchase the
required insurance and add the
cost to the amount of the loan.
When Jenkins defaulted on the loan
payments and stopped buying insurance, Gainer purchased insurance
and added the cost to the amount
Jenkins owed. Gainer also hired
George W. Heintz and the law
firm of Bowman, Heintz, Boscia &
McPhee ("Bowman") to file suit
against Jenkins to recover the
installment payments and insurance
costs. After filing suit, Heintz wrote
a letter to Jenkins' attorney seeking
to settle the case. The letter detailed
the insurance purchased by Gainer
and expressed a desire "to reach
some type of amicable practical
resolution."
Jenkins responded by suing Heintz
and Bowman for violating the Debt
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Collection Act. Jenkins alleged that
the insurance purchased by Gainer
and charged to her not only protected against damage and loss to the
automobile but protected Gainer
against the possibility of default by
Jenkins. As a result, according to
Jenkins, when Heintz and Bowman
attempted to include the entire
insurance cost in its suit and settlement efforts, they violated the Act.
Specifically, Jenkins claimed that
Heintz and Bowman violated a
provision that prohibits adding an
amount when attempting to collect
a debt "unless such amount is
expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt as permitted
by law." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (1988).
In this case, Jenkins alleged that the
agreement only expressly authorized
collection of the cost of insurance
against loss or damage to the automobile; so, when Heintz and Bowman
attempted to collect on a different
insurance policy, they violated the
Act. Jenkins' second claim asserted
that the actions of Heintz and
Bowman violated a provision of the
Act barring "any false, deceptive or
misleading representation or means
in connection with the collection of
any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (1988).
The federal district court, in an
unpublished opinion, dismissed
Jenkins' suit, saying that the Debt
Collection Act did not cover attorneys when they used litigation to
collect debts. On Jenkins' appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed, saying the
Act as amended applied to attorneys
engaged in debt-collection litigation.
25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994). The
Supreme Court granted the petition
for a writ of certiorari filed by Heintz
and Bowman to review the scope of
the Debt Collection Act as applied to
attorneys. 115 S. Ct. 416 (1994).
CASE ANALYSIS
The federal circuit courts of appeal
have disagreed over whether or not
the Debt Collection Act covers attor-

neys engaged in debt-collection litigation. The Fourth Circuit and Ninth
Circuit have agreed with the Seventh
Circuit that the statute includes
such attorneys. See Fox v. Citicorp
Credit Serv., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th
Cir. 1994); Scott v. James, 964 F.2d
314 (4th Cir. 1992). The Sixth
Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled
that the Act does not apply to attorneys engaged solely in debt-collection litigation. Green v. Hocking, 9
F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993). This division
is probably one reason the Supreme
Court decided to hear the case.
Those who advocate including attorneys engaged in debt-collection litigation within the scope of the Act
have emphasized the language of the
statute itself. They have stressed
that if the activities of attorneys
relate to the collection of debt from
a consumer, the attorneys will fall
under the Act's definition of debt
collector regardless of whether or
not the attorneys acted pursuant to
litigation.
These advocates place great emphasis on the 1986 amendment to the
Act which removed the attorney
exemption. Because the Act no
longer specifically excludes attorneys from its scope, they argue that
the Act no longer distinguishes in
any way between attorneys and
other debt collectors.
Courts ruling that the Debt
Collection Act covers attorneys
essentially end their analysis at this
point, saying that if the plain language of the Act covers these
actions, courts should not resort to
any other sources, including legislative history, to attempt to determine
its meaning. Jenkins argues, though,
that even if the Court looks to the
legislative history of the statute in
order to ascertain whether or not it
covers litigating attorneys, that history confirms that the Act, as
amended, was intended to include
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attorneys engaged in debt-collection
litigation.
Jenkins points to a suggested
modification to the 1986 amendment proposing that the Act continue to exempt attorneys "providing
professional legal services." Leonard
0. Abrams, Testimony on Behalf of
the Commercial Law League of
America, 90 COMm. L.J. 650, 651
(1985). This proposal, along with
other proposals to limit the exposure
of attorneys to the provisions of the
Act, did not receive congressional
approval. Jenkins asserts that this
means that Congress specifically
contemplated that attorneys engaged
in debt-collection litigation were
covered by the Act and must refrain
from the practices it prohibits.
Jenkins also argues that Congress
intended to cover the debt-collection
litigation activities of attorneys
because self-regulation by bar associations had proven ineffective.
Opponents of extending the Debt
Collection Act to attorneys conducting debt-collection litigation contend
that the plain language of the statute
does not conclusively encompass
attorneys engaging in such litigation.
They stress that the definition of
debt collector, while referring to the
"collection of any debts," does not
indicate what activities relate to the
collection of debts. Thus, in order
to determine the meaning of the
statute, its contextual background
must receive examination.
The legislative history of the 1986
amendment, according to those who
oppose extending the Act to litigating
attorneys, shows a clear intent to
exclude the activities of attorneys
with regard to debt-collection litigation. In Green, 9 F.3d at 18, a case
involving an attorney sued for filing a
lawsuit misstating the amount of the
debt by $100, the Sixth Circuit pointed to the stated intent of Congress
when it enacted the statute in 1977 to regulate debt-collection activities
American Bar Association

per se, not litigation activities. The
court referred, as do Heintz and
Bowman, to remarks entered into the
Congressional Record by Representative Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.), who
introduced the amendment striking
the attorney exemption. Commenting
three months after the bill's passage,
Representative Annunzio stated that
the amended Act applied "to attorneys when they are collecting debts,
not when they are ierforming tasks of
a legal nature." 132 Cong. Rec.
H10031 (1986).
Opponents of applying the Act to
attorneys engaged in debt-collection
litigation also stress the interpretation given the 1986 amendment by
the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), the agency that enforces
the statute. After the 1986 amendment, the FTC issued a staff memorandum which stated, "Attorneys or
law firms that engage in traditional
debt collection activities ... are
covered by the Act, but those whose
practice is limited to legal activities
are not covered." 53 Fed. Reg.
50097, 50100 (1988). While the FTC
interpretation does not bind courts,
courts may look to it for guidance.
Heintz and Bowman have warned
that interpreting the Debt Collection
Act to cover attorneys engaged solely in litigation activities would lead
to absurd results. Following the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, they
argue that if the law extended so far,
the Act's provision barring further
communication regarding the debt
upon the consumer's request, 15
U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (1988), would
mean that attorneys could not continue to prosecute lawsuits once a
consumer requested that communications cease. They also argue that
the provision subjecting debt collectors to liability for threatening "to
take any action that cannot legally
be taken," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5)
(1988), would subject attorneys to
liability whenever they took a position that did not succeed in court.

Finally, Heintz and Bowman stress
that other law adequately regulates
abusive actions by attorneys
engaged in debt-collection litigation. In particular, they point to
court rules forbidding attorneys
from filing lawsuits not "wellgrounded in fact" or "warranted by
existing law, or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Given
these enforcement mechanisms,
they maintain that there is no need
to interpret the Act to regulate abusive practices by attorneys with
regard to debt-collection litigation.
The Supreme Court will have to
draw two conclusions in order to
hold that the Act does not cover litigation activity like that conducted
by Heintz and Bowman. First, it
must decide that the amended Act
still does not reach the purely legal
activities of attorneys as opposed to
their debt-collection activities.
Second, it must rule that the activities engaged in by Heintz and
Bowman - filing the lawsuit and
writing the letter to Jenkins' attorney in an attempt to settle - constituted such purely legal activities
and not the acts of a debt collector
as defined by the Act.
SIGNIFICANCE
If the Supreme Court affirms the
decision of the Seventh Circuit,
thus finding for Jenkins, attorneys
who litigate cases involving collection of debts may find themselves
subject to liability for communications with the consumer or the
consumer's attorney regarding the
litigation. Furthermore, these attorneys would face personal liability
for any violations of the Act in conducting debt-collection litigation. If,
however, the Court reverses, thus
finding for Heintz and Bowman, the
collective sigh of relief from the
legal community might well be
audible.
(Continued on Page 222)
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ARGUMENTS
For George W. Heintz and Bowman,
Heintz, Boscia & McPhee (Counsel
of Record: D. Kendall Griffith;
Hinshaw & Culbertson; 222 North
LaSalle Street, Suite 300, Chicago,
IL 60601-1081; (312) 704-3000):
1. The plain language of the statutory definition of debt collector does
not include attorneys engaged in the
prosecution of consumer-debt
litigation.
2. The legislative history, the
interpretation of the Federal Trade
Commission, and the structure of
the Federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act all support an interpretation that attorneys engaging in
debt-collection litigation are not
debt collectors.
3. State and federal courts already
have procedures for regulating abusive activities by attorneys in litigating consumer debts.
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For Darlene Jenkins (Counsel of
Record: Joanne S. Faulkner; 123
Avon Street, New Haven, CT 06511;
(203) 772-0395):
1. The plain language of the Federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
after unqualified repeal of the attorney exemption, is unambiguous and,
accordingly, an attorney who regularly collects consumer debts is a
debt collector.
2. The legislative history of the 1986
amendment confirms the plain language of the Act.
3. The repeal of the attorney exemption does not lead to absurd results.

AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of George W. Heintz and
Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & McPhee
American Bar Association
(Counsel of Record: George E.
Bushnell, President, American Bar
Association; 750 Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, IL 60611; (312) 988-5000);
Commercial Law League of
America (Counsel of Record: Manuel
H. Newburger; Barron & Newburger;
900 Congress Avenue, Suite 200,
Austin, TX 78701; (512) 476-9103);
National Association of Retail
Collection Attorneys (Counsel of
Record: Ronald S. Canter; 7272
Wisconsin Avenue, 4th Floor,
Bethesda, MD 20814-4838;
(301) 951-8500).
In support of Darlene Jenkins
Sherry Ann Edwards, a consumer
(Counsel of Record: Andrew Rosen;
Stone, Sheefy, Rosen & Byrne; 1881
9th Street, No. 105, Boulder, CO
80302; (303) 442-0802);
Joint brief of National Consumer
Law Center, American Association of
Retired Persons, and the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago
(Counsel of Record: Robert J. Hobbs;
National Consumer Law Center; 18
Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108;
(617) 523-8010).
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